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Why is aesthetics important to Wittgenstein? What, according to him, is the 
function of the aesthetic? My answer consists of three parts: first, I argue that 
Wittgenstein finds himself in an aporia of normative consciousness – that is to 
say, a problem with regard to our awareness of the world in terms of its relation 
to a norm. Second, I argue that the function of Wittgenstein’s aesthetic writings 
is to deal with this aporia. Third, through a comparison with Friedrich Schlegel’s 
writings on allegory, I try to show that the way in which Wittgenstein resolves 
the aporia renders him a Romanticist philosopher. The point of an aesthetic inter-
action, for Wittgenstein, is that it can render clear what cannot be described 
without running against the walls of our cage: the absolute. Through aesthetic 
interactions we are able to (indirectly) access a ground for norms by which we 
experience ourselves as unconditionally bound.
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I. Introduction
Aesthetic considerations were at the centre of Wittgenstein’s thinking.1 Why? What, according 
to Wittgenstein, is the function of the aesthetic? My answer will consist of three parts: first, I 
will argue that Wittgenstein finds himself in an aporia of normative consciousness, that is to 
say, a problem with regard to our awareness of the world in terms of its relation to a norm. 
Second, I will argue that the function of Wittgenstein’s aesthetic writings is to deal with this 
aporia. Third, on the basis of Wittgenstein’s aesthetic writings and a comparison to the Early 
German Romanticists, I will give an interpretation of how Wittgenstein deals with this aporia.
 1 Wittgenstein’s writings are abbreviated as follows: ‘A Lecture on Ethics’, Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 3–12, 
abbreviated as LE; Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), abbreviated as LC (followed by a Roman numeral for the lecture, 
and an Arabic numeral for the paragraph); Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains, 2nd ed., 
ed. Georg Henrik von Wright and Alois Pichler, trans. Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), abbreviated as CV; 
Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1930–1933; From the Notes of G.E. Moore, ed. David G. Stern, Brian Rogers, 
and Gabriel Citron (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), abbreviated as M; On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. 
Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 
abbreviated as OC; Friedrich Waismann, ‘Notes on Talks with Wittgenstein’, Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 
12–16, abbreviated as NTW.
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The aporia of normative consciousness consists of its being both supernatural, as well as 
inescapable. Even though ethical norms according to Wittgenstein, are not entities of the 
natural world and so cannot be spoken of sensibly, still we find ourselves unable to stop 
searching for answers to questions of right and wrong. Normative beings, so Wittgenstein 
thought, find themselves inexorably confronted with the question of how to live rightly, but 
without anywhere to turn to in order to actually find norms that allow for a right life.
In his aesthetic writings, by contrast, Wittgenstein talks freely of norms that render the 
object of one’s aesthetic interaction right or correct. Even those objects that are correct in 
virtue of something else than the established cultural sensibilities of a particular time and 
place can be appreciated for their rightness. However, the norm or ‘hidden law’ to which they 
correspond cannot be articulated.
This raises a puzzle: how can aesthetic reasons attune us to the rightness of something, 
without articulating the terms in virtue of which this thing is right? Building on an appar-
ent affinity between Wittgenstein’s thinking and the Early German Romanticists, I will 
offer an interpretation according to which aesthetic practices are such as to move beyond 
philosophical argument in order to express and experience what philosophy aims for but 
cannot describe: the absolute, or the ultimate foundation of our normative frameworks. To 
come to accept an aesthetic reason is therefore to come to accept a way of thinking that first 
renders possible normative evaluation.
In the following, I will first make explicit what I take to be the aporia of normative con-
sciousness in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, specifically in ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ (Section II). I will 
then argue that Wittgenstein’s aesthetic remarks can be read as a way of dealing with this 
aporia while also giving rise to a puzzle: How can aesthetic reasons attune us to something 
they cannot articulate (Section III)? Lastly, I will offer my interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
aesthetic remarks by reading them under a Romanticist light (Section IV).
II. The Aporia of Normative Consciousness
Call normative consciousness any awareness of anything in relation to a norm to which that 
thing is taken to conform. The aporia of normative consciousness arises when we are aware 
of something in relation to an absolute norm, that is, a norm that does not derive from any 
description of what the thing is, but rather holds regardless. Such an awareness is one that 
Wittgenstein deems ethical in contradistinction to an awareness of ‘relative value’. The prob-
lem with an absolute normative awareness is its grounding: if it holds regardless of any mat-
ter of fact, we become unable to say why it should hold in the first place. Ethics, according to 
Wittgenstein, tries to go beyond the boundaries of scientifically verifiable statements and so 
its statements are, strictly speaking, nonsensical. But more than merely a pseudo-scientific 
discipline, ethics is also a state of mind that holds sway even if someone were to tell us 
that its statements were nonsense: more than merely defending an error-theoretical posi-
tion, Wittgenstein finds himself unable to negotiate the tension between the persistence 
of absolute normative consciousness and the inability to give a sensible articulation of that 
consciousness. That is the aporia.
Wittgenstein starts ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ with some introductory remarks that seem out of 
place, borderline offensive even. He tells his audience that he will make use of the format of 
the one-hour lecture to tell his audience something he is ‘keen on communicating’, rather 
than give them a lecture about logic, a topic that would rather require a full course of lec-
tures. Moreover, Wittgenstein rejects the alternative of a ‘popular-scientific lecture’ as a banal 
medium that does not accomplish anything in the way of understanding and instead satisfies 
only a ‘superficial curiosity about the latest discoveries of science’. Therefore, he will speak 
about ‘a subject which seems to [him] to be of general importance’, which, as it turns out, is 
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not logic or science at all, but rather ‘Ethics’ (significantly, and unlike words such as ‘science’ 
and ‘logic’, written with a capital first letter; LE, p. 4).
The contemptuous remark about pop-science can be read as a sneer against such works as 
James Jeans’s The Mysterious Universe, a book that Wittgenstein detested and thought mis-
leading (LC, III.36). But more significantly, the sneer also rehearses a central argument of the 
paper. Wittgenstein detests pop-science for two reasons. Most obviously, Wittgenstein found 
that popularizing science implied a kind of idol worship, an attitude contrary to the scientific 
mindset itself. Wittgenstein is implying that, contrary to science and logic, ethics is really 
rather the sort of thing that is of general importance. The layperson’s desire to understand 
science’s latest discoveries is then superficial, not only because a truly interested person will 
have a totally different mindset, but also because, in general, one should rather be curious 
about the problems of ethics. Already anticipating the conclusion of his lecture, Wittgenstein 
is setting up a dichotomy between science and ethical enquiry and is urging his audience to 
work up an interest in the latter. However, as we shall see, it will turn out to be impossible 
to argue that ethics is really of general importance, and so thereby the lecture will turn out to 
be itself an instance of the impossibility to articulate an absolute norm.
Wittgenstein starts the lecture proper with a distinction between the relative and the abso-
lute sense of the word ‘good’, and argues that only the latter (absolute) sense is the one that 
ethical enquiry concerns itself with. In its relative sense, ‘good’ refers to a correct set of affairs 
relative to a predetermined purpose. In its absolute sense, by contrast, ‘good’ refers to a norm 
that obtains regardless of any predetermination of purpose and, consequently, cannot be 
derived from any state of affairs. But whereas judgements of relative value are, ultimately, 
both unproblematic as well as trivial, judgements of absolute, ethical value present us with a 
big problem: they are nonsensical.
Judgements of relative value are those that hold true given a particular goal and as such are 
really just describable as statements of fact. Wittgenstein states: ‘Instead of saying “This is the 
right way to Grantchester”, I could equally well have said, “This is the right way you have to go 
if you want to get to Grantchester in the shortest time”’ (LE, p. 6). By contrast, judgements of 
absolute value cannot be redescribed in this way:
Now let us see what we could possibly mean by the expression, ‘the absolutely right 
road’. I think it would be the road which everybody on seeing it would, with logical 
necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not going. And similarly the absolute good, if 
it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his 
tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing 
about. And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera. (LE, p. 7, emphasis 
in original)
Wittgenstein is not saying that moral judgements are necessarily in error. Rather, he is reject-
ing the chimera of a conception of the absolute good as a describable state of affairs (which 
is different from saying that the absolute good itself is chimerical). The problem is, however, 
that no other register exists in language, other than that of the facts, that is, states of affairs 
that can be propositionally articulated. Thus, ethics is the nonsensical attempt to say something 
about that of which one cannot speak: ‘Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words 
will only express facts’ (ibid.).2
 2 The use of the word ‘supernatural’ makes clear that Wittgenstein is not just talking about ethical issues, but that 
he takes these to be deeply entwined with religious matters as well. And so, like ethical statements, Wittgenstein 
is evincing scepticism with regard to religious doctrines. See CV, p. 61.
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With this, Wittgenstein reaches his (in)famous conclusion that all attempts to articulate 
ethical (or religious) thought is a way of running against the boundaries of language: ‘This 
running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs 
from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the 
absolute valuable, can be no science’ (LE, pp. 11–12). Wittgenstein started his lecture with 
a dichotomy between science and ethics, but now it seems that ethics itself is a hopelessly 
(pseudo-)scientific attempt to capture in words that which is necessarily beyond language. 
Thus, it seems quite natural to conclude that we should therefore abandon all hope for ethi-
cal enquiry. After all, from the essential nonsensicality of any ethical statement, it is only a 
rather small step to the conclusion that ethics itself is a sham. It is only the very last sentence 
of the lecture that problematizes such a conclusion: ‘[Ethics] is a document of a tendency in 
the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my 
life ridicule it’ (LE, p. 12).
Besides the dramatic break with the earlier arguments purporting to show the nonsensical-
ity of ethics (rather than its respectability), what stands out in this sentence, is the shift from 
philosophical argument towards a personal confession. Instead of trying to convince his audi-
ence of the soundness of his conclusion, Wittgenstein merely talks about his own feelings. In 
conversation with Friedrich Waismann, he explained why this is important:
The ethical cannot be taught. If I needed a theory in order to explain to another the 
essence of the ethical, the ethical would have no value at all.
At the end of my lecture on ethics, I spoke in the first person. I believe that is quite 
essential. Here nothing more can be established, I can only appear as a person speak-
ing for myself. (NTW, p. 16)
Wittgenstein’s use of the confessional method has been noted by other authors, notably Stanley 
Cavell. According to Cavell, this medium is closely related to the message of Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy, particularly its conception of philosophy itself.3 Wittgenstein’s later work 
(in particular the Investigations) is not concerned with giving convincing arguments for or 
against a particular way of thinking, or ‘style of thinking’. After all, how would you convince 
someone of the validity of another way of thinking, if it is exactly one’s way of thinking that 
first renders this or that claim convincing?
In Section IV, I will return to the notion of a style of thought in Wittgenstein, as well as its 
aesthetic underpinnings. For now, what matters is that Wittgenstein, faced with the impos-
sibility to articulate why the ethical is important, can only confess that he feels this way. The 
hope is then that it persuades people to see things his way. But if they do not, Wittgenstein is 
powerless to actually convince them. In fact, then, though respect is a quintessentially ethical 
attitude itself, Wittgenstein’s feelings lack the very quality that would render them absolutely 
normative, that is, expressive of an absolute norm: intersubjective motivating force.
Of course, not every kind of respect is ethically important. For instance, I might feel a 
deep respect for the sportive accomplishments of Italian cycling legend Gino Bartali. It 
remains an open question, however, to what extent that feeling also compels me to trying 
to instil it in others. It seems perfectly reasonable, for instance, to believe this respect must 
be shared by other cycling fans but no one else necessarily. But this is not the kind of respect 
 3 Stanley Cavell, ‘The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy’, in Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of 
Essays, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 66. The confessional register also emphasizes 
once more that the ethical, for Wittgenstein, is inseparable from the religious.
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that Wittgenstein feels for the ethical. After all, this is what makes his lecture of general 
importance: the fact that the study of ethics is a testament to a tendency of which a human 
mind must not be free. Everyone, regardless of personal likings, should feel the way that 
Wittgenstein does. Even if, and precisely because, Wittgenstein, per his own arguments, is 
impotent to articulate why one should feel that way.
Thus, the lecture on ethics terminates in an aporia: even while it holds that ethical enquiry 
is the hopeless attempt to give scientific form to that which lies beyond the boundaries of 
our world, a hint of normative consciousness remains. As Wittgenstein put it himself, again 
in conversation with Waismann:
This thrust against the limits of language is ethics. I regard it as very important to 
put an end to all the chatter about ethics – whether there is knowledge in ethics, 
whether there are values, whether the Good can be defined, etc. […] But the tendency, 
the thrust, points to something. (NTW, p. 13, emphasis in original)
This hint of normative consciousness, the fact that we find in ourselves not mere psychologi-
cal causation but the inescapable impression that there is something pointing to something 
else that our language does not enable us to identify, this will subsequently become the 
defining element of Wittgenstein’s aesthetics.
III. The Perception of Fit
In this section, I shall argue that Wittgenstein’s aesthetic reflections address, in their own way, 
the aporia discussed in the previous section: the hint of normative consciousness and the 
impossibility of its articulation. I shall show, however, that while the aporia haunts the lecture 
on ethics, Wittgenstein is unbothered by it in his lectures on aesthetics. What Wittgenstein 
variously calls ‘the obscure paradigm’ or ‘hidden law’ according to which something is right, 
is not a problem, but rather a source of satisfaction even if it does (as it must) remain hidden.
I shall proceed as follows: first, I will try to show that Wittgenstein’s point of departure, a 
critique of psychological approaches to aesthetics, is meant as a way of arguing that what is at 
stake is not causality but rather normativity. In aesthetic interactions, we search for, ask, and 
try to understand reasons why we do (not) appreciate the object of aesthetic reflection/per-
ception. Second, I will further elucidate what such appreciation consists in for Wittgenstein: 
far from savouring a pleasure (either in the beautiful, or something else), it is an activity of 
orienting oneself according to an ideal that is taken to belong to the object of appreciation. 
That ideal, however, is not something that we can articulate: it remains a hidden law. I will 
conclude in a third step that this is how Wittgenstein sought to resolve the paradox of feeling 
the direction towards an absolute, which one cannot articulate: the pointing itself should be 
taken as sufficient.
One of the most striking features of Wittgenstein’s aesthetic thinking is his preoccupation 
with criticizing psychological approaches to questions of aesthetics:
People often say that aesthetics is a branch of psychology. The idea is that once 
we are more advanced, everything – all the mysteries of Art – will be understood 
by psychological experiments. Exceedingly stupid as the idea is, this is roughly it. 
(LC, II.35)
Wittgenstein finds the idea stupid for two (related) reasons. First, it mistakes a normative 
process (giving and understanding particular reasons for perceiving an aesthetic object in 
a particular way) for a purely causal affair (having pleasure because of some feature of an 
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object). Second, it is, again, a proposal to import the scientific method into a field of human 
interaction where it does not belong.
As to the first reason, Wittgenstein is at pains to argue that the psychological picture of 
aesthetic perceiving is misguided. It preoccupies itself with the particular likings of aesthetic 
percipients (for example, ‘I like the colour scheme’, ‘this part of the song is my favourite’), 
whereas aesthetics only really gets going once we start asking for the reasons for a particular 
liking: ‘The question of Aesthetics is not: Do you like it? But, if you do, why do you?’ (M, 9:27).
If that is the case, psychology would indeed be out of place, because the only kind of answer 
that it could give to the question why would be a causal explanation, and not a reason:
‘Why is the smell of roses so pleasant?’
What sort of an answer do you expect?
(1) All the smells which tickle your nose in this way are pleasant. This would be interest-
ing to some people; & could satisfy a person who meant to ask that question.
(2) This answer would not remove our aesthetic puzzlement. (M, 9:23)
That aesthetic puzzlement (Why should it be this particular way of tickling the nose that gives 
us such pleasure?) cannot be removed by psychology because it presupposes a different way 
of thinking about the matter entirely. It would construe aesthetics as an enterprise trying 
to first map the entirety of all our likings and then explain those likings in terms of a single 
causal relationship. That enterprise, to Wittgenstein, must have seemed like a chimera on a 
par with the ‘the absolute good’ conceived of as a describable state of affairs.4
Hence, Wittgenstein’s critique of psychologism in aesthetics goes hand in hand with his 
rejection of the role of beauty in the same. In both his 1933 and 1938 lectures on the topic 
(M, 9:19; LC, I.8), Wittgenstein is at pains to point out that aesthetic perceiving has nothing 
necessarily or even primarily to do with deciding whether things are ‘beautiful’ or not. The 
traditional preoccupation of aesthetics with the question of beauty is misleading, in the first 
instance because it seems to imply that aesthetic appreciation always, or even typically takes 
a shape similar to ‘standing before a painting and saying: “That is beautiful.”’5 That is obvi-
ously not the case, but more importantly, the preoccupation with beauty seems to imply a 
single sphere of life unified by one principle, the feeling of beauty, that can consequently 
be analysed as the cause of all the things we happen to take a liking to. Thus, what happens 
when we find something that removes our aesthetic puzzlement is not necessarily this or 
that feeling:
I’m now satisfied; I’m in a state of equilibrium, not of tension.
This may be a good metaphor; but there isn’t one feeling which characterises the 
thousand different cases of equilibrium. (M, 9:31)
 4 Wittgenstein’s anti-psychologism extents to religious matters as well. In the same vein, for instance, he 
reproaches James George Frazer who, in his The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1983), gave (more or less) reductionist explanations of religious rituals. For instance, the Beltane 
fires in Scotland, which he takes simply as a remnant of a ritual of human sacrifice because part of the ritual 
consist of pretending to throw someone in the fire. See M, pp. 328–30. Against this, Wittgenstein argues that 
this does no justice to the self-understanding of participants in the ritual: ‘[…] pretending to burn is something 
which has its own feeling & its own seriousness. And that in other cases a real human being was burnt, only 
shews that all sorts of different things exist side by side’ (M, 9:8).
 5 Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (London: Cape, 1990), 405.
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Thus, Wittgenstein is not rejecting that beauty does not play any role in aesthetics whatsoever, 
but rather that it should be the central feature to be analysed and explained scientifically.
This brings me to the second reason why Wittgenstein finds the idea of a psychological 
science of aesthetics stupid. Sardonically, Wittgenstein says of such a science, ‘I suppose it 
ought to include also what sort of coffee tastes well’ (LC, II.2). If one is committed to the idea 
that aesthetics is about the stuff to which we take a liking, how could you make a principled 
difference between liking coffee and liking a symphony?6 But Wittgenstein wants not only to 
say that it is a tall order to distinguish between liking an artistic object and liking some other 
thing. He is also trying to show that aesthetic appreciation need not consist in a liking at all:
If we have a certain arrangement of colours & say it is beautiful, & you suggest that 
what this means is that it gives us pleasure.
I ask: Why should we use so many different means to get pleasure?
Answer isn’t merely that you can’t get asparagus in winter; but obviously that what 
you want is not merely pleasure but a certain kind of pleasure.
And if you want a certain kind of pleasure, e.g. tulips admired with pleasure; why 
shouldn’t you want the tulips without the pleasure? (M, 9:18–19)
It might seem odd to be in a situation of admiring the tulips without taking pleasure in 
the admiration, but Wittgenstein is not arguing that this is often what actually happens 
in aesthetic interactions. Rather, he is suggesting that the pleasure we often feel in aes-
thetic appreciation need not have anything to do with how we think of the tulips from an 
aesthetic perspective.7 In fact, Wittgenstein considers the opposite condition, (unpleasur-
able) aesthetic interactions, to be all the more revealing of what it is we do in aesthetic 
perceiving:
You design a door and look at it and say: ‘Higher, higher, higher […] oh, alright.’ 
(Gesture) What is this? Is it an expression of content?
Perhaps the most important thing in connection with aesthetics is what may be called 
aesthetic reactions, e.g. discontent, disgust, discomfort. The expression of discontent 
says: ‘Make it higher […] too low! […] do something to this.’ (LC, II.10)
The point of what Wittgenstein calls ‘directed discomfort’ (LC, II.10–16) is not to argue (against 
all available evidence testifying to the contrary) that aesthetic perceiving is actually a more or 
less painful activity. Rather, Wittgenstein wants to show that by focusing on feelings alone, 
we leave out the more interesting half of the phenomenon we are trying to understand. 
Those feelings are directed to something: an ideal or norm to which the object of perception 
is supposed to correspond. And it is this ideal which is really what is important.
In other words, Wittgenstein is arguing that aesthetic interactions are interpretative prac-
tices, ways in which we try to understand the object appreciated (What is it that it belongs to? 
 6 See Rhees’s notes about the quoted comment: ‘It is hard to find boundaries’ (LC, II.2).
 7 It might be possible, for instance, to find it an aesthetic shortcoming that tulips are so pleasurable. See as well 
his remark, in a later lecture, on not wanting to listen to a great piece of music: ‘I’m not going [to hear the music] 
[…] because I can’t stand its greatness: i.e. if anything, it is disagreeable’ (M, 9:26).
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What is its paradigm?), rather than savour the feelings incited.8 And this, indeed, one can see 
more clearly in the case of a discomfort, rather than when we perceive with pleasure. After 
all, once we have already realized the ideal, the sense of direction towards it is also lost. The 
urgency of trying to understand is removed, and what we experience is first and foremost a 
feeling of satisfaction. Moreover, it is this being directed towards an ideal that psychology 
can never make sense of. Because the psychological way of thinking can only yield causes: 
‘Aesthetic reasons are given in the form: getting nearer to an ideal or farther from it. Whereas 
Psychology gives causes why people have an ideal’ (M, 9:36).
What matters in aesthetic interactions are ideals, not causal relations. Of course, one could 
say that it is precisely its being removed from the ideal that is the cause of one’s discomfort 
with a particular object of appreciation. But one can only say this in a sense that subtly differs 
from a psychological study into the causes of one’s discomfort:
Saying you know the cause of your discomfort could mean two things.
(1) I predict correctly that if you lower the door, I will be satisfied.
(2) But that when in fact I say: “Too high!” ‘Too high!’ is in this case not conjecture. Is 
‘Too high’ comparable with ‘I think I had too many tomatoes today’? (LC, II.14)
One would expect Wittgenstein to make a difference between ‘efficient’ and ‘final’ cause, that 
is, between the biological processes that make one think that one has had too many tomatoes 
on the one hand, and the ideal or norm (the ‘telos’) to which I am directed in settling the cor-
rect height of a door on the other. But the distinction actually cuts deeper, at least when it 
comes to aesthetic perceiving. He says, namely, that not only are we not positing an efficient 
cause of our discomfort when we say that the door is too high, he says that we are not making 
any conjecture whatsoever.
Consider the following, elucidating remark published in Culture and Value, with regard to 
the overture to the opera Figaro:
The ‘necessity’ with which the second idea succeeds the first. (Overture to Figaro.) 
Nothing could be more idiotic than to say it’s ‘pleasing’ to hear the second after the 
first! – But the paradigm according to which everything there is right is certainly 
obscure. (CV, p. 65, emphasis in original)
It is not because it would produce pleasure, that the ordering of ideas appears necessary. But 
neither is the paradigm, or the norm of rightness in question, a clear one. Of course, some-
times, we have a clear idea about aesthetic norms, for example, the correct width of a lapel on 
a suit jacket (LC, II.8), the ideal features of a face according to the Ancient Greeks, and so on. 
These norms are philosophically trivial: it is merely established, socio-historically determined 
 8 This is where Wittgenstein’s approach differs from Kantian approaches according to which aesthetic experiences 
are constituted by a unique kind of (disinterested) feeling. Wittgenstein does not deny that feelings might be 
important in trying to understand something aesthetically. On the basis of the passages quoted above, however, 
it is clear that according to him, no feeling amounts to a sine qua non of aesthetic experiences (a familiar com-
mitment, on the other hand, of Kantian aesthetics). At the same time, however, it is important to note that the 
difference between Wittgenstein and Kant may not be all that stark. One might argue, for instance, that under-
standing aesthetic reasons and experiencing aesthetic feelings are always intertwined moments of one and the 
same process of taking on an aesthetic attitude, or of reflecting and/or judging aesthetically. For Kant too, after 
all, the feeling of disinterested pleasure cannot be thought in isolation from the free play of the (cognitive) facul-
ties of the imagination and the understanding. Getting clearer on the relation between feeling and understand-
ing in Kant and Wittgenstein, Kantians and Wittgensteinians, is a topic for another occasion. Thanks to Richard 
Eldridge for pressing this objection and pointing the way to further research.
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cultural sensibilities that make it the case that ‘a suit lapel should be this long’. Statements 
such as these are simply about relative value and, like the statement pointing the right way 
to Grantchester, they can be rewritten as statements about matters of fact (‘given that lapels 
of this length are all the rage nowadays…’).
On the other hand, what is really at stake, aesthetically speaking, is not becoming satisfied 
that a predetermined or predeterminable ideal has been realized. We see this precisely in the 
case of awe-inspiring artworks like the overture to Figaro, or a symphony by Beethoven: we 
are struck by an undeniable sense of the necessity of the composition, without being able to 
answer the question: ‘necessary, for what?’
But what is at stake, then? It becomes tempting to think that great art does not abide 
by any norms we are familiar with, because it posits its own standards. Joachim Schulte, in 
his reading of Wittgenstein’s aesthetics, briefly entertains this idea before dismissing it. He 
argues that some things that would show up as faults in an ordinary musical composition, 
could also show up as an intended and meaningful stroke of genius in a sublimely written 
piece of music.9 Of course, Wittgenstein would argue that a work that posits its own standards 
cannot conflict with them. And if it cannot conflict with them, it is also wrong to say that it 
can follow them: the entire normative dimension falls away. Schulte resolves this tension by 
arguing that the standard of sublime, or tremendous works is not actually a standard of right-
ness or correctness.10 This is not, I believe, the most fruitful way to read Wittgenstein, not in 
the last place because he does, in fact, talk about the rightness of great works of art (such as 
the overture to Figaro in the passage quoted above), as Schulte also notes.
Instead, I want to suggest that the important thing about aesthetic interactions, incidentally 
the thing that comes to the fore dramatically in great artworks, is that we are satisfied about 
rightness of the work without any knowledge of the norm in question. When Wittgenstein 
speaks of the ‘obscure paradigm of rightness’, it becomes tempting to think of an ideal model, 
an Ur-opera, from which all great opera’s derive their greatness. Of course, there is no such 
thing, but the feeling remains that great works of art point in that direction, that it is because 
of such a norm of absolute value that we believe them to be right, or absolutely successful 
(rather than correct for this or that purpose). Hence, the following cryptic remark in the lec-
tures on aesthetics from 1933:
Goethe in Metamorphose der Pflanzen, suggests that all plants are variations on a 
theme. What is the theme?
Goethe says ‘They all point to a hidden law.’ But you wouldn’t ask: What is the law? 
That they point, is all there is to it. (M, 9:33)
The hidden law that explains the variations of plants, like the obscure paradigm that explains 
the necessary ordering of musical ideas in Figaro’s overture, cannot itself become clear. But 
neither is this necessary for us to experience the fittingness, or success, of the overture.11 
In that experience, what is available to the understanding is something like the judgement 
 9 Joachim Schulte, ‘Ästhetisch richtig’, in Chor und Gesetz: Wittgenstein im Kontext (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1990), 
80.
 10 Ibid. Schulte bases himself on LC, I.23: ‘In certain styles in Architecture a door is correct, and the thing is you 
appreciate it. But in the case of a Gothic Cathedral what we do is not at all to find it correct – it plays an entirely 
different role with us.’
 11 See Schulte, ‘Ästhetisch richtig’, 81: ‘[…] der springende Punkt ist, daß [die Ouvertüre zu Figaro] trotz der 
Unmöglichkeit einer expliziten Formulierung gelingen kann mitzuteilen (und sei es noch so indirekt), warum 
die Abfolge notwendig, natürlich oder richtig erscheint.’
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 without its justification: normative success without an understanding of the norm that makes 
Figaro’s overture necessary just so.12
There is a remarkable parallel in wording between this passage and Wittgenstein’s remark 
to Waismann, quoted at the end of Section II: both the ethical as well as the aesthetic cannot 
be articulated, but an awareness of them ‘points to’ something: a hidden law, or obscure para-
digm. In his lectures on aesthetics, however, there is a slight twist: here, at least, Wittgenstein 
is able to draw the conclusion that an articulation of the hidden law itself is also unnecessary 
when it comes to appreciating the things that correspond to it: ‘That they point, is all there 
is to it’ (M, 9:33).
This, it seems, is an instance of the later Wittgenstein’s signature move: a therapeutic 
gesture intended to dissolve a philosophical problem so that peace may now ensue. In this 
case, however, it seems to just raise more questions. Firstly, if objects of aesthetic apprecia-
tion point to a hidden law, why should it be impossible to elucidate that law? Or the other 
way around, if we cannot articulate a law to which these objects conform, how can we say 
that they are actually pointing to it? If aesthetics is about reasons why we like something, 
is it not contradictory to then hold that an actual articulation of why an object is right, is 
uncalled for?
In Section IV, I will offer an interpretation that I hope will take care of the troubles caused 
here.
IV. Wittgenstein as a Romanticist
Wittgenstein has argued that aesthetic reasons are supposed to be given in the form of ‘get-
ting nearer to an ideal or farther from it’ (M, 9:36), but also that it is silly to actually ask what 
it is that makes a particular aesthetic judgement the right one: that law is and will remain 
hidden. But if there is no way in which one could know what renders an aesthetic judge-
ment correct, the question arises whether there really is such a thing as giving aesthetic 
reasons. In this section, I will offer an interpretation of aesthetic reasons as of a persuasive, 
or ‘propagandistic’ form. On this reading, the point of an aesthetic reason is not to elucidate 
the law that renders one’s judgement correct, but rather to change the way one views or 
thinks of something, or: one’s style of thinking. Style, for Wittgenstein, denotes the frame-
work within which our normal justificatory practices, practices of right and wrong, first get 
going. It is what early German Romanticists have called ‘the absolute’, that is, the ultimate 
foundation of our knowledge claims that bestows certainty upon them while it itself cannot 
be justified. I will show that reading Wittgenstein under an early German Romanticist light 
will allow us to make sense of the idea of aesthetic reasons. Aesthetic reasons ground the way 
in which we make sense of the world, while remaining groundless themselves. Consequently, 
 12 Here, I believe we can put Schulte’s point (from the previous footnote), a little more strongly: it is not just the 
case that great art communicates why its composition is necessary ‘ever so indirectly’. Rather, we only perceive 
that its composition is necessary, and so (as I will argue in the next section) great art indirectly hints at there 
being an absolute norm of correctness. Incidentally, this makes Wittgenstein’s position different from what is 
called ‘particularism’ about aesthetic judgement, the idea that in judging something aesthetically, we make no 
appeal at all to general principles. For a defence of this view, see Arnold Isenberg, ‘Critical Communication’, 
Philosophical Review 58 (1949): 330–44. Isenberg shares Wittgenstein’s conviction that, because the norm is 
unavailable to us in judgement, aesthetic judging consists rather of giving ‘directions for perceiving’. The par-
ticularist line of reasoning, however, typically arises out of a commitment to empiricism which concludes in the 
belief that there simply are no absolute, general norms. This, as we have seen, is altogether alien to Wittgenstein. 
See James Shelley, ‘The Concept of the Aesthetic’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
winter 2017 ed. (Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-concept/. Thanks to 
Richard Eldridge for pressing me to clarify Wittgenstein’s position in this matter.
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this understanding of aesthetic reasons, a unique kind of reason that can convince, or per-
suade (LC, III.33)13 without justification, can shed light on Wittgenstein’s aporia of normative 
consciousness.
In the following, I first explicate the ‘propagandistic’ status of aesthetic reasons: they per-
suade rather than justify, because they first constitute a framework for justification, or style. 
The discussion of aesthetic reasons as, in a sense, propaganda will thus lead me into a discus-
sion of the role of style in Wittgenstein’s thinking. I will show that, for Wittgenstein, style 
denotes a framework of thinking that enables us to assess the rightness or wrongness of 
something and which is therefore unable to be normatively assessed itself. In other, already 
familiar terms: there is no absolute normative framework. With the Romanticists, however, 
Wittgenstein shares the conviction that the absolute, that of which one cannot speak, can 
nevertheless be shown. Indeed, this is the function of an aesthetic reason: to express the 
absolute rightness of something (a way of thinking, the choice of musical or painterly compo-
sition, the ending of a story, and so on). Artworks or, more generally, expressive practices are 
such that they express more than what is said stricto sensu. To speak with Friedrich Schlegel: 
they are allegorical.14 In saying something other than what they say, they attune us to that 
which lies beyond the describable world: a paradigm that remains obscure, a law that remains 
hidden, the feeling that one is oriented towards an absolute norm.
Ordinarily speaking, reason giving happens in pretty much the same way that statements 
of relative value are redescribed as matters of fact. ‘This is the right way to go!’ Why? A good 
reason might be: ‘if you want to go to Grantchester, there is simply no quicker way than this 
one.’ So, unless we want to take the scenic route, there is no debating the reason. It is simply 
a matter of fact.
With aesthetic reasons, things are different. Of course the practice is similar enough: 
you make an aesthetic judgement about, say, a poem which strikes you as old-fashioned. 
Why should it strike you so? What matter of fact would explain that the poem is really 
old-fashioned?
Suppose a poem sounded old-fashioned, what would be the criterion that you had 
found out what was old-fashioned in it[?] One criterion would be that when something 
was pointed out you were satisfied. And another criterion: ‘No-one would use that 
word today’; here you might refer to a dictionary, ask other people, etc. I could point 
out the wrong thing and yet you would still be satisfied. (LC, III.9, emphasis in original)
What happens when I point out the wrong thing that nonetheless satisfies you? Is your 
aesthetic judgement then factually incorrect? I take Wittgenstein to be arguing that the sole 
proof of a good aesthetic reason is whether it is able to appease the mind that is puzzled aes-
thetically, in principle regardless of any matter of fact. One might refer to a dictionary, or even 
conduct a statistical survey that shows relative word usage over time, but unless what one 
says strikes a chord with you, these reasons will not be good (though it is, of course, possible 
that the empirical facts will be taken as satisfactory).15
 13 In a way, such reasons are not really reasons at all. See also OC, § 612: ‘At the end of reasons comes persuasion’ 
(emphasis in original). Thanks to Gorazd Andrejc for pointing out this passage to me.
 14 See Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, trans. Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 178.
 15 See the paragraph that immediately follows the one quoted above: ‘Suppose someone heard syncopated music 
of Brahms played and asked: “What is the queer rhythm which makes me wobble?” “It is the 3 against 4.” One 
could play certain phrases and he would say: “Yes. It’s this peculiar rhythm I meant.” On the other hand, if he 
didn’t agree, this wouldn’t be the explanation’ (LC, III.10).
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Aesthetic reasons do not necessarily elucidate any facts. Rather, they prompt us to change 
the way we think about the object appreciated, or to see different aspects of it. For instance, 
an aesthetic reason might make us see the rabbit, rather than the duck, in the famous ‘duck-
rabbit’ picture. I do not simply say ‘This is clearly a rabbit, because it has a rabbit’s ears’, 
because to one inclined to see the duck, the rabbit’s ears are not ears at all, but a duck’s beak. 
That reason then merely obliges us to give another reason explaining why those arcs are ears, 
rather than a beak. And obviously, I cannot here simply say that the arcs are ears because 
they are located above the rabbit’s eye, because to one inclined to see the duck, the arcs 
are located rather below the duck’s eye, thus obliging me to give another reason, and so on. 
Instead of regressing infinitely back down a chain of reasons, I rather say things like ‘Look! 
This is how the picture must be looked at’, accompanied, perhaps, by some rotating of the 
picture, some gestures pointing out the rabbit’s features, and so on.
What sort of a reason is this? Obviously, no amount of gesturing is going to prove that this 
really is the way to look at the picture. In fact, merely saying that this is the way to look at 
something, is hardly an argument for that conclusion at all, even if the statement produces 
satisfaction in the addressee. If, however, the feeling of satisfaction is the only measure of suc-
cess for an aesthetic reason, then it follows that aesthetic reasons need only be persuasive and 
not necessarily a sound justification for a conclusion. In fact, if the goal of aesthetic reasons 
is to change the way we look at something, and we depend on the way in which we look at 
it in order to evaluate claims about it as right or wrong, then aesthetic reasons seem to beg 
the question (that is, they assume what they purport to prove). Of course, not every question-
begging reason is persuasive. But if an aesthetic reason does succeed in changing the way in 
which we look at something, it has done so by other means than sound argumentation. For 
this reason, Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘persuasion’ is meant to get at something other 
and (potentially) more problematic than an activity animated by the force of the better argu-
ment. To accentuate this problematic aspect of persuasion, Wittgenstein also calls it ‘propa-
ganda’: ‘I am in a sense making propaganda for one style of thinking as opposed to another’ 
(LC, III.37).
Aesthetic reasons are propagandistic, because they attempt to change what cannot be 
rationally argued for: style. Style (in Wittgenstein) denotes, first and foremost, a particular 
form, or way of thinking: a framework for making sense of something and/or appreciating 
it. It is a framework according to which something (for example, a musical arrangement, or 
a philosophical argument) appears as necessary or right. More than a collection of linguis-
tic mannerisms, then, style determines ‘what can appear as a possible object of thought, 
because the style characterizes the way one researches and gives reasons’.16 Thus, the notion 
of style gets at something much more fundamental, indeed it gets at whatever is fundamen-
tal: philosophical foundations justifying arguments,17 and also, significantly, religious belief.18 
 16 Joachim Schulte, ‘Stilfragen’, in Chor und Gesetz, 61.
 17 Stanley Cavell has argued that Wittgenstein’s own style of thinking is underpinned by a method of evaluating 
claims that is, at base, a kind of aesthetic judgement. Stanley Cavell, ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy’, 
in Must We Mean What We Say?, 68–90.
 18 That religious believing consists in having a particular style of thinking may sound strange, but it is indeed 
how Wittgenstein thought of religion. I have already noted (ftn. 2) that he does not think of religion in terms 
of a collection of doctrines, and (ftn. 4) that his anti-psychologism in aesthetic matters extends to religious 
matters as well. We can now say, further, that Wittgenstein believes that religion, like ethics, is unamenable to 
philosophical articulation. See CV, p. 89: ‘If Christianity is the truth, then all the philosophy about it is false.’ See 
also Mulhall’s interpretation that religious language games have no real grammar, since religious statements 
are necessarily nonsensical: Stephen Mulhall, ‘Wittgenstein on Religious Belief’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Wittgenstein, ed. Oskari Kuusela and Marie McGinn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 772. Thus, an argu-
ment might be made to the effect that aesthetics stands to the statements of religion as it does to the  statements 
of (philosophical) ethics. That argument lies beyond the confines of this article, however.
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And aesthetic reasons, accordingly, are reasons directing one to change the foundations of 
one’s thinking: they are reasons to change what we find convincing or justifiable in the first 
place. And such a change, necessarily, is without rational justification.
Wittgenstein here shows an affinity with a group of thinkers we now refer to as the early 
German Romanticists. Central to these writers’ concerns was a rejection of the idea that there 
can be given an ultimate foundation to our knowledge claims, which foundation they referred 
to as ‘the absolute’. More specifically, they argued ‘that we could not grasp the Absolute in 
thought, to say nothing of being able to arrive at it in reality’.19 This was so, they thought, 
because any attempt to ground a claim to knowledge itself presupposes another ground, 
leading to an infinite regress (like the attempt to justify that one sees a duck, rather than a 
rabbit). The attempt to give such a foundation, that is, philosophy, is thereby understood as a 
‘longing [Sehnsucht] for the infinite’, as Friedrich Schlegel puts it.20
Philosophy remains merely a longing, according to this interpretation, because it cannot 
satisfy itself. Instead, Schlegel argues, philosophy finds its fulfilment in, and as art. This is 
because, contrary to philosophy, artworks say more than they actually do say: their meaning is 
allegorical: ‘[…] all beauty is allegory. Precisely because it is inexpressible, one can only express 
the highest allegorically.’21 Allegory, a form of speech through which we allude to something 
else than that which we actually say, can express what is strictly speaking inexpressible. To 
conceive of artistic expressions as essentially allegorical, means to conceive of them as mean-
ingful (or having a Bedeutung) to the extent that they point to (hindeuten) something beyond 
what they actually say.22 Art lends itself, therefore, to the expression of the absolute.
The way in which the Romanticists try to articulate the limits of rational justification may be 
able to shed some light on Wittgenstein’s thinking. Indeed, there is a fruitful line of thought 
situating Wittgenstein as a relativist philosopher, that is, one who holds that the knowledge 
we have arises out of (socio-historically situated) practices in which propositions are first 
meaningful and which are themselves without a stable foundation. Questions of knowledge 
aside,23 we already saw that at least some such relativism holds for ethical questions: ethics, 
that is, the philosophical study of questions of absolute right and wrong, is the nonsensical 
attempt to articulate the foundations of what we believe right and wrong, which are beyond 
language. Accordingly, the only thing we can talk about, are judgements of relative value, 
that is, value given particular motivations that are assumed and not themselves justified. 
Wittgenstein’s relativism here recalls Novalis’s claim that the attempt to give a philosophical 
articulation of the absolute ‘leads into the spaces of nonsense’.24 But if ethics is senseless, 
what remains is ethical consciousness, the awareness of an absolute norm.
That consciousness of absolute norms, it seems, may yet be expressed artistically/alle-
gorically, even if it cannot be articulated philosophically. In a lecture headed as ‘Harmony 
between thought & reality’, Wittgenstein argues that that which bestows validity upon our 
 19 Frank, Philosophical Foundations, 24.
 20 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Introduction to the Transcendental Philosophy (1800)’, in Theory as Practice: A Critical 
Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings, ed. and trans. Jochen Schulte-Sasse et al. (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1997), 245, emphasis in original. I here focus on Schlegel’s writings, because it is there that 
the Romanticist conception of the function of art is most explicitly formulated.
 21 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poesy (1799)’, in Theory as Practice, 189.
 22 ‘[Schlegel] understands “meaning” (Bedeutung) in the sense of “suggestion”, (Hindeutung) “hinting at”, 
(Anspielung) “indirect allusion”’, Frank, Philosophical Foundations, 208–9.
 23 For more on Wittgenstein’s epistemological relativism, see Martin Kusch, ‘Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and 
 Relativism’, in Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives; Proceedings of the 37th International 
Wittgenstein Symposium, ed. Harald A. Wiltsche and Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 29–46.
 24 Novalis, Fichte Studies, ed. and trans. Jane Kneller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 150 (§ 466). 
See also Frank, Philosophical Foundations, 24.
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capacity for judging right and wrong, a foundational harmony between mind and world, is 
something beyond language:
And this is general: whatever is fundamental, can’t be talked about.
What philosophers mean is what makes it possible to judge rightly about the world: 
but this is what makes it possible to judge wrongly.
This harmony [between thought & reality] can’t be described, & therefore is not in 
ordinary sense a harmony at all.
It is expressed by expressions/of thought & reality/having something in common. (M, 
5:36, emphasis in original)
Schlegel speaks of the absolute paradoxically, that is, as the inexpressible that nevertheless 
finds expression in allegory. In only a slightly different approach, Wittgenstein sets up a 
dichotomy between expression and description in order to argue that the absolute is acces-
sible after all, just not as a (describable) matter of fact.
So, how can the absolute be nevertheless expressed? Again, the Romanticist notion of the 
allegorical is instructive: the allegorical can express the inexpressible because it does so indi-
rectly. It expresses the inexpressible by expressing inexpressibility.25 The inexpressibility of 
the absolute comes to the fore in the richness and individuality of an artwork (which Schlegel 
argues is the proper object of art criticism26): ‘Are not all systems individuals, just as all indi-
viduals are, at least in embryonic form and tendentially, systems? […] Are there not individuals 
that contain entire systems of individuals within them?’27 If artworks are such individuals 
that contain individuals (which presumably, contain yet further individuals, and so on), then 
our understanding of such works is always, to some extent, an abstraction from the wealth 
of meaning that belongs to an individual artwork. And so, when that activity of understand-
ing is foregrounded, our awareness of our inability to grasp it may grow, like our awareness, 
indirectly, that there is something that exceeds our grasp: the absolute.
We can now make sense of Wittgenstein’s aesthetic resolution of the aporia of absolute 
normative consciousness. Recall that the aporia consisted of feeling oneself oriented towards 
an absolute norm, without being able to give sensible articulation to that norm. The impos-
sibility of articulation, or as we may now say, the indescribability of the absolute poses seri-
ous problems for ethics qua study of absolute norms. But in aesthetic perception no such 
troubles exist, for even if it cannot be described, it can nevertheless be conveyed (and conse-
quently experienced).
Against the background of Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture on Ethics’, his talk of aesthetic reasons in 
his lectures on aesthetics seems puzzling: If we cannot intelligibly speak of absolute norms, 
how can there be such a thing as aesthetic appreciation of objects that are absolutely valu-
able? His solution, moreover, does not seem to help matters: while aesthetic reasons orient us 
towards an ideal, that ideal itself (at least in the case of great artworks) remains a ‘hidden law’. 
Here, and with the help of an Early German Romanticist background (in particular, Friedrich 
Schlegel’s philosophy), I have attempted to make sense of this idea, by arguing that aesthetic 
reasons are not truly reasons at all, but rather ‘propagandistic’ entities that merely express the 
 25 ‘Allegory […] is, therefore, a necessary manifestation of the unpresentability [Undarstellbarkeit] of the infinite’, 
Frank, Philosophical Foundations, 208.
 26 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Fragments on Literature and Poesy (1797)’ in Theory as Practice, 334 (fragment no. 634).
 27 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Athenäum Fragments (1798)’, in Theory as Practice, 323–24 (fragment no. 242).
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rightness of the style of thinking that they propagate. Aesthetic reasons are such as to change 
the style of our thinking, which first bestows on us a framework for normative evaluation and 
which remains itself indescribable.
So, how do aesthetic reasons make manifest a style of thinking? They do so, by means 
other than (direct) description, that is, through allegory: by making us appreciate a dimen-
sion of artistic meaning that transcends what is actually there to be described, art points to 
something beyond our (factually describable) world. In this way, aesthetic perceiving evinces 
a discrepancy between what is said, and what is meant: the hidden law itself remains hidden, 
but what matters is merely that the object of aesthetic perception points to it, that is, that the 
artwork can only be understood if we acknowledge that it orients us to something of which 
we cannot say what it is.
How does this help us understand the ethical orientation towards absolute norms? By way 
of a conclusion, I would like to consider one of Wittgenstein’s more familiar aphorisms on 
style: ‘“Le style c’est l’homme.” “Le style c’est l’homme même.” The first expression has a 
cheap epigrammatic brevity. The second, correct, one opens up a quite different perspective. 
It says that style is the picture of the man’ (CV, p. 89, emphasis in original). The remark is 
puzzling, because the second expression properly translates to ‘Style is the very man’ and not 
‘Style is a representation of the man’. Why would one need the idea of a picture to make sense 
of perceiving ‘the very person’?28 Given my reading of the aporia of normative consciousness, 
I offer the following interpretation: the ‘very’ nature of our status as persons is given by the 
idea of absolute normativity, or our capacity to conduct ourselves in accordance with norms 
that hold regardless of any matter of fact. If that is the case, however, an understanding of 
ourselves becomes indescribable in precisely the sense Wittgenstein argues that absolute 
ethical norms are indescribable. A proper understanding of our normative status is rather 
available only indirectly, that is, by way of a picture which expresses that which it is not. 
Accordingly, the first expression (‘Le style c’est l’homme’) misses the point entirely, as it is 
not as if we arrive at an understanding of personhood by appreciating the idiosyncrasies of a 
person’s character. The norms acknowledged as binding by any particular individual must not 
be mistaken for the absolute norms that hold for everyone.29 But those absolute norms can 
only be hinted at, that is, through the (artistic) expression of what it means to be a person (or 
a normative being): the picture of her, which succeeds only if it can point beyond itself. That 
is the function of art for ethical beings.
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